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Many opine that President Trump is bad for South 
Korea-Japan relations, but he can be a positive 
influence if Seoul and Tokyo wake up to the dangers 
they are facing. Critics have argued that Trump’s 
disregard for U.S. alliances has led to the failure of the 
U.S. government to contain disputes between South 
Korea and Japan. While acknowledging the importance 
of the United States as a mediator between the two 
East Asian countries, I argue that Trump has actually 
given a strong incentive for Seoul and Tokyo to set 
aside their rivalry – to save their U.S. alliances from him.
In an influential 1999 book, Victor Cha argues that the 
relationship between South Korea and Japan becomes 
less conflictual when both states perceive U.S. security 
commitment in East Asia to be declining. Trump has 
indeed cast doubt on U.S. commitment to the two allies 
although the U.S. foreign policy establishment is still 
firmly committed to the U.S. role as a military protector 
in the region. Granted, South Korea-Japan solidarity 
despite antagonism is far from automatic, and their 
domestic politics will continue to hinder improvement 
of the bilateral relations, but Seoul and Tokyo have 
important strategic reasons to overcome their frictions.
Many pundits claim that the bilateral relation is at 
its lowest point after its normalization in 1965. For 
example, in October and November 2018, South 
Korea’s supreme court ordered Japanese firms to pay 
compensation for wartime forced labor during Japan’s 
colonial rule, throwing into question the postwar 
settlement based on the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations 
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between Japan and the Republic of Korea. In November 
2018, the South Korean government dissolved the 
foundation funded by Japan to compensate the so-
called “comfort women,” dealing a blow to the 2015 
bilateral agreement to settle the issue of the wartime 
sexual slavery. Since December 2018, when a South 
Korean warship allegedly locked fire control radar on a 
Japanese surveillance plane, the two governments have 
been blaming each other for dangerous behavior. The 
radar-locking incident has been particularly worrisome 
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because the two countries’ defense officials had 
traditionally maintained cordial relationships 
even when the diplomatic relations were strained.
Then came the news of the so-called “Cost Plus 
50” plan. Seoul and Tokyo should treat it as a 
wake-up call to deal collaboratively with the threats 
their U.S. alliances are facing. President Trump is 
reportedly planning to demand payment, from host 
countries of U.S. troops, covering the entire cost of 
stationing plus 50 percent. As many experts have 
already noted, such a plan which multiplies the 
host countries’ financial contribution is unrealistic, 
but it will still hurt the credibility of U.S. security 
commitments and domestic political support for the 
alliances in the host nations. The excessive demand 
from the U.S. president may be a negotiation ploy, 
but the tactic is dangerous because Trump has 
demonstrated a genuine disdain for U.S. alliances.
In February 2019, South Korea and the United States 
concluded negotiations of their 10th Special Measures 
Agreement (SMA), which delineates Seoul’s financial 
contribution for hosting U.S. troops. South Korean 
negotiators managed to limit the rise of the payment 
to an 8.2 percent increase (as opposed to the reported 
initial U.S. demand to double the previous amount), but 
the agreement is set to expire in a year, forcing both 
sides to return to negotiations almost immediately 
after signing the agreement. Mike Bosack, who 
participated in the most recent SMA negotiations 
between the United States and Japan, noted that 
South Korea was the “first test bed” for Trump’s cost-
sharing policy and Japan was “next after that.” The 
current SMA between Japan and the United States 
will expire at the end of March 2021, with negotiations 
probably launching in late 2019 or early 2020. 
South Korea and Japan need to coordinate their SMA 
negotiation strategies not just to save money but 
to preserve the long-term viability of U.S. alliances 
in East Asia. Above all, the East Asian allies must 
avoid (a) buying U.S. favor at the expense of each 
other and (b) appeasing U.S. adversaries such as 
China and Russia. There are short-term gains to be 
made by such strategies, but they will backfire soon.
First, South Korea and Japan must avoid undermining 
each other in their respective cost-sharing dealings 
with the Trump administration. It is no secret 
that Seoul and Tokyo compete to win favor from 
Washington, be it on North Korea policy, history 
disputes, or general prestige in the hierarchy of U.S. 
partners. Accommodating Trump’s demands is an 
easy way to differentiate oneself from the other 
allies, especially if public opinions of other allies 
make it difficult for the president to achieve one 
of his well-known foreign policy goals – to extract 
more financial concessions from U.S. allies. With 
Trump in the White House potentially until 2025, 
however, South Koreans and the Japanese should 
seriously worry about the risk of the other’s alliance 
with the United States becoming weak. U.S. security 
commitments to different allies are widely considered 
to be interlinked, and U.S. forces stationed in Korea 
and Japan naturally have complementary roles. 
Another way through which East Asian allies may 
cope with the Trump risk could be to appease 
alliance adversaries such as China, Russia, and North 
Korea, but this is not advisable either. Conciliating 
adversaries is sometimes a viable policy option, and 
there are diplomatic and economic gains Seoul and 
Tokyo could pursue by appeasing the adversaries, in 
addition to the supposed benefit of reduced military 
tensions. In the current circumstances, however, 
South Korea and Japan would have to negotiate 
with the adversaries from a weak position, and their 
appeasement of the adversaries will be used by the 
U.S. president to further undermine the alliances. It is 
important to maintain support for the alliances from 
the U.S. foreign policy establishment, and appearing 
soft towards adversaries can create the perception 
of disloyalty or weaken the rationale for the alliances.
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South Korea and Japan can resist President Trump’s 
anti-alliance policies in various ways, but their efforts 
are unlikely to succeed without cooperating with each 
other. They should coordinate how they calculate the 
costs of hosting U.S. troops to challenge the arbitrary 
number that U.S. negotiators are likely to bring to the 
table. Seoul and Tokyo should work together in many 
other ways such as waiting out President Trump with 
window dressing of burden sharing, working with 
pro-alliance officials within the U.S. government, and 
engaging with adversaries without undermining U.S. 
alliances. The U.S. president gave a reason to work 
together but, ultimately, South Korea and Japan have 
to save themselves from the acrimonious disputes.
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